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The Math Matters….
4GAO Methodology
• GAO defines cost growth as the change in total program 
acquisition costs from the original estimate to the current estimate
• GAO publishes an annual report  focused on cost growth
– Summarizes 96 acquisition programs
– Stated a $296B cost growth for the FY08 portfolio, down from $301B in 
FY07
• The fine print…. 
1) Procurement of additional quantities and/or required capability counts as 
“bad”;
2) Differing “portfolios” compared on an annual basis;
3) Pre-Milestone B estimates used (i.e, before the program defined);
4) Poor early performers can never recover, even if they have been 
performing well for many years;
5) Acquisition painted with broad brush as though all programs are broken.
5Our Interpretation
• Procurement of additional quantities and/or required capability 
is not cost “growth”
– Quantity and capability enhancements due to mission requirements
should not be chargeable to cost growth. 
– AT&L estimates capability enhancements alone account for $96B of total
• Portfolio cost growth cannot be compared on an annual basis
– Analysis is grounded in dissimilar comparison of programs. 
– 59 programs moved into or out of the portfolio between 2003 and 2008.
• Pre-Milestone B estimates should not be used
– Pre-Milestone B estimates are incomplete and are not a reliable estimate
– AT&L methodology uses the more reliable Milestone B estimate
– This alone yields total cost growth of $278B as opposed to $296B.
6Our Interpretation
• Past sins never forgiven (…some remorse is useful though)
– Original estimates are done many years ahead of actual production and can 
be greatly outdated.  Examples are JSF, FCS, V-22, and C-17.
– Twelve of the current programs are 15 years or older; 41 of the programs 
had a MS B before 2001 (Oldest: Trident II Missile July 1987)
– Example: JSF and FCS programs are planned to be in the portfolio until 
2034 and 2030, respectively.  By GAO methodology, they will keep a $78B 
cost growth mark even if they have no cost growth for the next 25 years!
– Portfolio cost growth over last 5 years is $176B
• Sinners and saints
– The top eight highest cost growth programs account for about 80% of the 
total cost growth.
– DDG 51, FCS, and JSF alone account for more then 45% of total
– 29 Programs have zero or negative cost growth
7More Meaningful Metrics Needed
• AT&L proposed new set of metrics to more fairly represent 
weapon system cost growth
– Performance Analysis: Total cost growth over a period of time
– Trend Analysis: Average yearly cost growth over a period of time
• GAO, OMB and OSD(AT&L) worked together to develop new 
metrics to measure acquisition cost growth
– Continue to measure cost growth from Original Estimate
– Fair, transparent, and fact based (unbiased) metrics meant to provide total 
visibility
• GAO and AT&L agreed to conduct a pilot study using new metrics
8Top 10 Cost Growth Programs
All data in $B, FY09





DDG 51 Destroyer Feb-88 48 -1
Future Combat System (FCS) May-03 39 39
F-35 / Joint Strike Fighter Oct-01 38 56
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Feb-88 24 3
C-17 Globemaster III Dec-88 23 0
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774) Jun-95 23 -1
C-130J Hercules Oct-96 11 -4
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles Oct-88 10 1
CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (ICH) May-98 9 5
Stryker Family of Vehicles Nov-00 8 8
Total 238 108
9What’s Happened Lately?














1 JSF 188.3 244.8 56.5 48 Light Utility Helicopter 1.7 1.9 0.2
2 FCS 89.8 129.7 40.0 49 AIM-9X 3.1 3.3 0.2
3 CVN 21 3.5 29.9 26.5 50 SSGN 4.4 4.5 0.1
4 DDG 1000 11.4 27.6 16.2 51 Cobra Judy Replacement 1.6 1.7 0.1
5 Stryker 8.0 16.1 8.1 52 AGM-88E AARGM 1.5 1.6 0.1
6 BLACK HAWK Upgrade 13.2 20.8 7.6 53 VH-71 6.5 6.6 0.1
7 BFVS A3 Upgrade 3.3 10.1 6.8 54 RMS 1.4 1.5 0.1
8 Chem Demil-CMA 22.1 28.5 6.4 55 SSDS 0.6 0.6 0.1
9 CH-47F 7.0 12.7 5.6 56 ERM 1.4 1.4 0.0
10 NPOESS 7.1 10.9 3.8 57 CH-53K 16.0 16.0 0.0
11 LONGBOW APACHE 8.7 12.3 3.6 58 GBS 0.8 0.9 0.0
12 AMRAAM 14.4 17.9 3.6 59 FAB-T Increment 1 3.5 3.5 0.0
13 Global Hawk 6.3 9.7 3.4 60 LAIRCM 0.4 0.4 0.0
14 V-22 OSPREY 52.4 55.5 3.1 61 WIN-T Increment 1 3.9 3.9 0.0
15 EFV 10.8 13.7 2.9 62 WIN-T Increment 2 3.6 3.6 0.0
16 Chem Demil-ACWA 4.4 7.2 2.8 63 NAS 1.6 1.6 0.0
17 SBIRS High 9.6 12.2 2.6 64 B-2 EHF 0.7 0.7 0.0
18 AEHF 5.5 7.9 2.4 65 B-2 RMP 1.3 1.2 -0.1
19 ARH 3.5 5.8 2.3 66 MUOS 6.5 6.4 -0.1
20 FMTV 19.0 20.7 1.7 67 C-5 RERP 10.2 10.1 -0.1
21 H-1 Upgrades 7.0 8.5 1.5 68 EA-18G 8.7 8.6 -0.1
22 JASSM 4.3 5.7 1.4 69 Minuteman III GRP 2.9 2.8 -0.1
23 MH-60R 10.6 12.0 1.4 70 JTRS GMR 16.7 16.6 -0.1
24 MH-60S 6.6 8.0 1.4 71 MPS 1.7 1.6 -0.2
25 E-2D AHE 14.2 15.6 1.4 72 SM-6 5.5 5.3 -0.2
26 JSOW Unitary 1.3 2.6 1.3 73 PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Missile 7.0 6.8 -0.2
27 TACTICAL TOMAHAWK AUR 3.2 4.5 1.3 74 CEC 5.1 4.9 -0.2
28 JTRS NED 0.9 2.0 1.1 75 SDB 1.8 1.5 -0.3
29 ATIRCM/CMWS 3.8 4.8 1.1 76 P-8A MMA 30.0 29.6 -0.4
30 Javelin 4.9 5.8 0.9 77 MP-RTIP 1.7 1.3 -0.4
31 Navstar GPS User Equipment 1.3 2.1 0.9 78 VTUAV 2.5 2.0 -0.5
32 C-17A 72.7 73.6 0.9 79 JDAM 6.4 5.8 -0.7
33 C-130 AMP 4.7 5.4 0.8 80 PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit 18.7 17.9 -0.8
34 FBCB2 2.8 3.5 0.7 81 ADS Increment Alpha 1.5 0.6 -0.9
35 T-AKE 4.8 5.5 0.7 82 PATRIOT PAC-3 Missile Segment 10.7 9.8 -0.9
36 TRIDENT II MISSILE 48.9 49.6 0.7 83 VIRGINIA CLASS SUB 82.8 81.6 -1.3
37 AB3 7.0 7.6 0.6 84 DDG 51 77.5 75.9 -1.7
38 MIDS 2.0 2.6 0.6 85 JSOW Baseline/BLU-108 4.0 2.2 -1.8
39 C-5 AMP 0.9 1.5 0.5 86 HIMARS 4.2 2.1 -2.1
40 T-45TS 8.1 8.6 0.5 87 Excalibur 4.6 2.3 -2.3
41 Navstar GPS Space & Control 6.7 7.1 0.5 88 LPD 17 16.8 14.4 -2.4
42 CVN 68 6.4 6.8 0.4 89 MRAP 26.7 22.5 -4.2
43 WGS 1.7 2.1 0.4 90 C-130J 17.1 12.3 -4.8
44 Minuteman III PRP 2.6 2.9 0.3 91 F/A-18E/F 57.0 51.8 -5.2
45 JLENS 6.4 6.7 0.3 92 GMLRS 11.2 5.4 -5.8
46 JPATS 5.5 5.7 0.2 93 JTRS HMS 9.7 3.0 -6.7
47 LHA Replacement 3.1 3.3 0.2 94 F-22 Raptor 82.2 73.7 -8.5











Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________
For Immediate Release March 4, 2009
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies
Subject: Government Contracting
The Federal Government has an overriding obligation to 
American taxpayers. It should perform its functions efficiently 
and effectively while ensuring that its actions result in the best 
value for the taxpayers...
I further direct the Director of OMB, in collaboration with the 
aforementioned officials and councils, and with input from the 
public, to develop and issue by September 30, 2009, 
Government-wide guidance to…
“I reject the false choice between securing 
this nation and wasting billions of taxpayer 
dollars ….  I recognize the real choice 
between investments that are designed to 
keep the American people safe and those 
that are designed to make a defense 
contractor rich.
“…GAO looked into 95 major defense 
projects and found cost overruns that 
totaled $295 billion. Let me repeat: That's 
$295 billion in wasteful spending. And this 
wasteful spending has many sources. It 
comes from investments and unproven 
technologies. It comes from a lack of 
oversight. It comes from influence peddling 
and indefensible no-bid contracts that have 
cost American taxpayers billions of dollars.”
BARACK OBAMA
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Mandate for Reform. . .
The perennial procurement and contracting cycle – going back 
many decades – of adding layer upon layer of cost and 
complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and 
longer to build must come to an end. There is broad agreement 
on the need for acquisition and contracting reform in the 
Department of Defense. There have been enough 
studies. Enough hand-wringing. Enough rhetoric. Now is the 
time for action.”
Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, 




- We get it.  A lot’s been done.
Hill Position. . .
– S. 454, Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Levin-McCain)
– H.R. 2010, Weapons Acquisition System Reform Through Enhancing 
Technical Knowledge and Oversight Act of 2009 (Skelton-McHugh)
WAY AHEAD. . .
– Three pronged approach: 
• Acquisition Workforce Reform
• Tactical Acquisition Reform




– Increasing number of acquisition personnel by 20,000 (~15%)  
positions over 2010-2015 FYDP
• 9,000 new civilian hires 
• 11, 000 conversions from contractor to federal civilian positions
– Improve Training and Human Capital Planning
– Reinvigorate and Raise Certification Standards
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Tactical Acquisition Reform
Building Strong Program Foundations for More Predictable 
Outcomes:
The Department’s recently revised acquisition policy (DoD Instruction 
5000.02) emphasizes building strong program foundations.      
– Starting Programs Right
• Identifying Critical Warfighter Needs & Maintaining Requirements Stability
• Emphasizing Cost Realism & Improving Cost Estimating
– Executing Programs Properly
• Integrating Test and Evaluation
• Disciplining Systems Engineering
• Integrating Life Cycle Management Principles
• Improving Dialogue with Industry & Tying Profit to Performance
– Improving Program Management & Oversight
• Conducting More Frequent Program Reviews to Assess Progress
• Using Information to Manage Programs Effectively
• Empowering Program Managers
• Improving Acquisition of Services Management
– Delivering Timely Solutions
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Strategic Acquisition Reform
Aligning Strategy, Budget, and Governance:
• ACTIONS NEEDED:
– Align Investment Priorities to Strategic Priorities
– Balance Existing and Future Investments to Provide the Right Mix
Capabilities at the Right Time
– Assign Responsibility for Fulfillment of Capability Gaps
– Establish a Fixed/Stable Investment Budget





• DoD understands cost growth is an area of concern and is 
working to put processes in place to adhere to these 
fundamental principles
• Key elements that drive successful programs are funding and 
requirements stability, and greater technology maturity
– DoD policy requires configuration steering boards for all major programs
– DoD is conducting early milestone reviews, using competitive prototyping, 
and increasing technology readiness levels for new programs. 
– DoD is strengthening personnel initiatives, to include tenure agreements 
with program managers and developing plans to improve and grow the 
workforce
• Continue to update laws and policies governing acquisition 
process
– In 2007 Congress passed legislation requiring a Certification for Pre-
MDAPs at MS A
– Skelton/McHugh Legislation and Levin/McCain Legislation
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Example Program: V-22
-Total Acquisition Performance Cost Analysis:
-Pass:  < 2% increase for total cost % change from prior year comparison
-Pass:  <10% increase for total cost % change from 5-year comparison
-Fail:  >15% increase for total cost % change from first original baseline
-Average yearly change in Total Acquisition Cost:
-Pass: Improved from prior year comparison
-Pass: Improved from 5 year comparison


















































Base Year $M: 1986 1986 2005 2005 2009 2009 2009 2009
Reporting Year: Dec-88 Dec-02 Dec-06 Dec-07
Total Acquistion Cost (BY$M) 18,518.8 31,233.2 50,610.5 50,472.8 30,546.0 52,017.7 54,997.6 54,781.8 79.3% 5.3% -0.4% 3.1% 1.0% -0.4%
RDT&E 2,471.4 7,168.5 11,526.9 11,508.2 4,233.3 12,279.0 12,621.2 12,600.7 197.7% 2.6% -0.2% 5.9% 0.5% -0.2%
Procurement 15,911.3 24,030.0 38,893.1 38,713.8 26,312.7 39,738.7 42,376.4 42,181.1 60.3% 6.1% -0.5% 2.5% 1.2% -0.5%
MILCON 136.1 34.7 190.5 250.8 233.6 59.6 207.5 273.2 16.9% 358.6% 31.7% 0.8% 35.6% 31.7%
O&M 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Procurement Quantity 682 456 456 456 682 456 456 456 -33.1% 0.0% 0.0% -2.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Quantity 682 458 458 458 682 458 458 458 -32.8% 0.0% 0.0% -2.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Program Acquistion Unit Cost ($M) 27.2 68.2 110.5 110.2 45.1 113.7 120.5 120.2 166.3% 5.7% -0.3% 5.3% 1.1% -0.3%
Average Procurement Unit Cost 23.3 52.7 85.3 84.9 38.6 87.1 92.9 92.5 139.8% 6.1% -0.5% 4.7% 1.2% -0.5%
Schedule
Initial Operating Test & Evaluation Jun-06 Jun-06 Jun-08
Initial Operating Capability May-92 Sep-04 Jun-07 Jun-07
Milestone B Jun-05 Apr-86 Apr-86 Apr-86
Milestone C Dec-89 Oct-05 Oct-05 Oct-05
Basic Data Perfomance Analysis Trend AnalysisFY09 Conversion
Only metrics reported by GAO
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Program Acquisition Sunk vs. Remaining Cost





























































H-1 UPGRADES (4BW/ 4BN)
APACHE BLOCK III (AB3)
BRADLEY UPGRADE


















































Trident II (D-5) Missile UGM 133A Jul-87
DDG 51 Destroyer Feb-88
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Feb-88
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles Oct-88
C-17 Globemaster III Dec-88
AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Dec-88
Advanced Anti-Tank Weapon System - Medium Jun-89
F-22A Raptor Feb-92
Joint Standoff W eapon (JSOW) Baseline/BLU-108 Jun-92
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Jun-92
CVN-68 Class/Carrier Replacement Program Jun-93
Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) Aug-93
Dr. Nancy L. Spruill
Director, Acquisition Resources & 
Analysis, OUSD(AT&L)




• Weapon System Acquisition Cost Growth
• Acquisition Reform
– Acquisition Work Force Reform
– Tactical Acquisition Reform




Work Force Reform Initiatives 
Managing Programs with a Robust, Qualified, Agile and Ethical 
Workforce:
– Smartly Grow the Acquisition Workforce
• Increase the contracting & oversight workforce, including DCAA.
• Enhance pricing and program-estimating capability. 
– Balance Government and Contractor Support
• Grow organic capability while downsizing the contractor support workforce. 
– Target Training and Human Capital Planning
• Complete an enterprise-wide competency assessment of the acquisition workforce. 
• Identify gaps and improve both training and human capital planning. 
– Reinvigorate and Raise Certification Standards
• Update certification programs and raise applicable standards.
• Reward valued employees through structured recognition and incentive programs. 
– Formalize Requirements Manager Certification
• Includes several requirements-manager training courses.
• Ensure that requirements managers understand their role throughout the acquisition 
cycle, including controlling requirements “creep.”
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Tactical Acquisition Reform Initiatives
Establishing a Firm Foundation for More Predictable Outcomes:
• Starting Programs Right
– Instituted a Materiel Development Decision (MDD) review 
– Instituting a requirement for competitive prototyping at either a key sub-system or full 
system level to demonstrate technology maturity. 
• Targeting Solutions Defined by the Joint Warfighter
– JROC is experimenting with the delegation of Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) authority 
to appropriate functional combatant commands. 
– Coordination with Combatant Commands required for all Joint requirements documents 
that support milestone decisions.
• Identifying the Critical Needs of the Warfighter
– JROC approves all capabilities documents for major defense acquisition programs and 
a significant percentage of the capabilities in the enabling portfolios. of battlespace
awareness, net-centric, command and control, and logistics. 
• Emphasizing Cost Realism
– Using Congressionally-mandated certifications before MS A and MS B to improve 
realistic cost estimating based on capability need and priority.
– Developing cost accounting systems for capital equipment that can provide information. 
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Tactical Acquisition Reform Initiatives
Establishing a Firm Foundation for More Predictable Outcomes:
• Integrating Test and Evaluation
– Implemented new policies designed to improve the integration of developmental and 
operational testing throughout the system lifecycle.  
– Improving the complementary relationship between developmental and operational 
testing, eliminate costly redundancy, and ensure that test results are a key element of 
the knowledge-base that informs management decisions.
• Disciplining Systems Engineering
– Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) is required to guide each phase of the development 
process.  
– SEPs are independently reviewed at the executive level and incorporate event-driven 
technical reviews to ensure that program progress is carefully monitored consistent 
with sound engineering business practice. 
• Integrating Life Cycle Management (LCM) Principles
– Incorporation of LCM considerations early in the design and development of weapon 
systems to ensure readiness and lower operations and support costs. 
– Implemented a mandatory KPP of Material Availability in the acquisition processes.
• Improving Dialogue with Industry
– Increased emphasis on prototyping before program initiation will result in a more 
effective dialogue with industry that will improve their understanding of our needs and 
our understanding of their capabilities. 
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Tactical Acquisition Reform Initiatives
Establishing a Firm Foundation for More Predictable Outcomes:
• Maintaining Requirements Stability
– Established Configuration Steering Boards in each DoD component to review all 
requirements changes and any significant technical configuration changes.
• Tying Profit to Performance
– Moving away from Time and Materiel and award fee contracting and instead is 
emphasizing the use of objective incentives tied to delivered performance, be it 
technical, schedule or cost.
• Conducting More Frequent Program Reviews to Assess Progress
– Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review have been identified as 
additional acquisition process decision points to provide acquisition decision authorities 
the opportunity to assess progress and direct remedial action when required.
• Using Information to Manage Programs Effectively
– Effort underway to systematically address and revamp where necessary the EVM 
system
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Tactical Acquisition Reform Initiatives
Establishing a Firm Foundation for More Predictable Outcomes:
• Empowering Program Managers
– Efforts underway include Tenure Agreements and Qualifications for Program Managers, 
Program Management Agreements (PMA), emphasis on professional civilian program 
manager development, use of program manager forums, and enhanced
recruitment/retention and monetary/non-monetary rewards. 
• Establishing Flexible and Rapid Response Teams to Resolve Tough Issues. 
– Joint Analysis Teams set up to proactively engage all stakeholders and drive decisions 
that deliver resilient, joint, strategic capability at the lowest possible cost.
• Improving Acquisition of Services Management
– DoD has issued new policy designed to ensure comprehensive oversight and effective 
planning, contracting and execution for acquisition of services.
• Delivering Timely Solutions
– Changes have been instituted within the JCIDS Instruction that more clearly define the 
scope of Capability-Based Assessments and ensure they remain focused and 
streamlined to help quickly and clearly define the Capability gap. 
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Strategic Acquisition Reform Initiatives
Aligning Strategy, Budget, and Governance:
• Align Investment Priorities to Strategic Priorities
– To properly align strategy to investment, the National Defense Strategy needs 
to include a top-down investment strategy. Funding top-lines, should drive what 
resources the Department will make available for the development of new 
systems.
• Balance Existing and Future Investments to Provide the Right Mix
Capabilities at the Right Time
– Requires a strategy that defines which desired strategic objective capabilities 
and an understanding of resource constraints to effectively identify risks and 
trades and produce an executable and stable investment plan.
• Assign Responsibility for Fulfillment of Capability Gaps
– During the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department
designed a concept—joint task assignment—intended to clearly establish 
responsibility for emerging tasks - operational and force development and 
identify the resources to support those tasks up-front before resources were 
executed.
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Strategic Acquisition Reform Initiatives
Aligning Strategy, Budget, and Governance (continued):
• Establish a Fixed/Stable Investment Budget
– Department must commit to stabilizing investment funding by realistically 
pricing programs, fully funding them up front and maintaining that level of 
funding throughout by enforcing established investment priorities and strategic 
guidance.
• Create Integrated and Effective Governance
– DoD has overlapping governance processes for resource allocation, acquisition 
and requirements development. There is a need for clear delineation of roles 
and/or merging of roles to ensure these governance bodies work in concert in 
executing the established investment strategy.
